The Basque Country, the Chechen separatist movement, the Tibetan monks, or the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria-What these groups have in common is their desire to separate from the nations in which they are currently included. But separatism is not an easy process: Separatist movements often face resistance from the majority and are sometimes even violently suppressed. (Hartman & Hsiao, 1988; Lyon & Uçarer, 2001 ). Yet, despite the widespread prevalence of separatist movements, there is a striking lack of psychological research into the majority's response to separatism. Media images of forceful suppression of separatist movements such as those in Chechnya or Tibet may lead us to conclude that the majority typically responds in an aggressive manner. However, this impression may be misleading because peaceful responses are far less likely to draw worldwide media attention. The aim of the current study was to examine the likelihood of a peaceful response to separatism. We demonstrate that members of the majority experience separatist movements as a threat to the integrity and continuation of their national identity. Moreover, we show that they can respond to these feelings of threat by supporting government measures aimed at helping the separatist group.
Separatism is defined by the Oxford English Reference
Dictionary as "the advocacy of a state of cultural, ethnic, tribal, religious, racial, governmental or gender separation from the larger group" (Pearsall & Trumble, 1996) . As such, it includes a wide range of schisms, although the term is most commonly associated with national separations. Sani and colleagues studied the motives underlying schismatic processes in two Italian political parties and in the Church of England (Sani, 2008; Sani & Reicher, 1998; Sani & Todman, 2002) . They demonstrate that the intention to separate from the majority is rooted in the perception that the majority's norms and values are incongruent with the separatist group's social identity (Sani & Reicher, 1998; Sani & Todman, 2002) and that the separatist groups feel estranged from the majority (Sani, 2008) . This is captured in the term "identity subversion," which refers to a sense that the group's essence has been undermined by changes introduced by the majority. Perceptions of identity subversion were found to decrease the extent to which the group was seen as a homogenous 499613P SPXXX10.1177/0146167213499613Personality and Social Psychology BulletinVan Leeuwen and Mashuri research-article2013 1 VU University Amsterdam, Netherlands 2 University of Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia 2 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin XX (X) entity and the extent to which members identified with the group (Sani & Pugliese, 2008) .
Although subgroups with separatist intentions may feel that there is no future for them within the majority group, worldwide anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that the majority group often does not feel the same way and actively opposes separatist tendencies. We propose that the knowledge that part of one's nation has plans to split off and continue as an independent unit constitutes a form of identity threat to members of the majority. The social groups that people belong to can form a basis for self-definition and self-esteem (Brewer, 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) , and nationality, in particular, is an important part of our identity (Schildkraut, 2011) . Changes in the nature or composition of a valued group require fundamental alterations to the meaning of group members' social identity, and this can cause resistance (Ethier & Deaux, 1994) . Although separatism or schisms have never been studied in this regard, research on mergers and organizational restructures provides valuable insights into people's reactions to fundamental changes to the composition of their group. The general finding is that people tend to resist fundamental changes to the composition of their organization or department (Boen, Vanbeselaere, Brebels, Huybens, & Millet, 2007; Giessner, 2011; Jetten, O'Brien, & Trindall, 2002; Terry, Carey, & Callan, 2001; Ullrich & van Dick, 2007) , and they do so more strongly to the extent that they experience the merger as a change to, rather than a continuation of, their premerger organizational identity (Giessner, 2011; Gleibs, Mummendey, & Noack, 2008; Ullrich, Wieseke, & van Dick, 2005; van Leeuwen, van Knippenberg, & Ellemers, 2003) . Giessner (2011) described a sense of continuity as "a general feeling that the merged organisation is a continuation of the pre-merger organisation" (p. 1080). Research has demonstrated that a strong sense of continuity inhibits the detrimental effects of a merger on employees' postmerger attachment to the organization. Similar evidence is obtained with respect to the merging of countries-for example, the German reunification (Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007) .
Because separatism involves the separation of a subgroup from a nation, members of the majority may experience this separation as a fundamental change to their national identity. That part of the nation that intends to separate from the majority may represent an important part of the nation's culture, as reflected in, for example, it's unique geography, history, language, or cuisine. Separation would imply that all these features no longer contribute to the majority's national identity, which requires members of the majority to redefine themselves as members of their nation. Given the importance of a sense of continuity as demonstrated in merger-research, the belief that one's nation could fundamentally change if the separatist group is successful in gaining independence may threaten majority members' sense of identity continuity. We thus propose that, to members of the majority, separatist movements constitute a threat to the continuation and integrity of their national identity (continuation threat).
Existing literature has identified many possible responses to identity threat, ranging from disidentification to discrimination (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Hutchison, Jetten, Christian, & Haycraft, 2006) . Recently, however, van Leeuwen and Täuber (2010) proposed that helping can also be an effective (and peaceful) response to identity threat. They argued that helping is often a form of strategic communication in which the helper can signal to the recipient important in-group qualities such as warmth (Mashuri, Zaduqisti, & Supriyono, 2012; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2012 ), or competence (van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2011 . Research demonstrated that people try to correct negative images of their group by presenting themselves as helpful and generous (Hopkins et al., 2007; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2012) . Helping can also be used as a means of communicating information about the desired relationship with the recipient, as examined in the context of power and dominance relations. For example, groups that seek to control other groups provide specific forms of help (i.e., dependency oriented help) to affirm and strengthen the recipient group's dependency on the helper (Nadler, Harpaz-Gorodeisky, & Ben-David, 2009 ), whereas groups in need of help may refrain from seeking help from other groups with which they have a troublesome relationship (van Leeuwen, Täuber, & Sassenberg, 2011) . Based on these findings, we propose that helping can also be used to communicate a desire to establish or restore a positive relationship with another group. This is because helping itself is viewed as an act of kindness (Hopkins et al., 2007) , and people who help others can generate liking, trust, and respect (Alvarez & van Leeuwen, 2011) . To the extent that separatist groups threaten the continuity of a national identity, members of the majority may be motivated to help the separatist group to signal that this group is valued and appreciated and that it should remain included.
The Present Research
We examined the notion that helping can be used as a tool to negate the threat caused by the separatist movement in two studies conducted in the Republic of Indonesia. In Indonesia, the two most active separatist movements are the West Papua Freedom Movement (OPM) in West Papua and the Aceh Freedom Movement (GAM) in Aceh. Papuans and Acehnese have been struggling for independence for decades, using peaceful and violent means, and likewise facing peaceful and nonpeaceful responses from the Indonesian government and military (Miller, 2009) .
We recognize that a potential change to the nature and integrity of the Indonesian national identity is not the only threat the Indonesian majority faces if either West Papua or Aceh were to secede. Both provinces have rich natural resources. West Papua is home to the world's largest gold reserves and vast reserves of copper (Budiardjo, 2005) , and Aceh houses large reserves of oil and natural gas. If either becomes economically independent from the Republic of Indonesia, the economic consequences for Indonesia would be considerable. When the separatist group possesses valuable natural or human resources, its separation from the majority can drain the latter's wealth and threaten its economic position-a type of threat we will refer to as economic threat. Although feelings of economic threat could also be reduced through attempts to persuade the separatist group to change their mind (i.e., through helping), we believe that a prosocial response to economic threat is less likely. Research has shown that economic or realistic threat triggers competition over scarce resources, which fosters group conflict (Campbell, 1965; Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998) . Economic competition is also known to debilitate intergroup helping exchanges (Jackson & Esses, 1997; . It is therefore unlikely that economic threat will be a positive predictor of the willingness to help the separatist group.
Overview of the Studies
Participants in both studies were Javanese students, representing the nonseparatist majority group. Java is the home of approximately 60% of the Indonesian population; it includes the nation's capital Jakarta, and generally dominates Indonesia politically, economically, and culturally. Participants were induced to believe that existing separatist movements in West Papua (Study 1) or Aceh (Study 2) were currently decreasing (low call for separatism) or increasing (high call for separatism) their efforts to gain independence. We subsequently measured perceived threat to the continuation of the Indonesian national identity, perceived economic threat, and participants' support for governmental measures to help the separatist group. We predicted that participants in the high call for separatism condition would experience more continuation threat and economic threat than participants in the low call for separatism condition (Hypothesis 1). We further predicted that participants in the high call for separatism condition would express more support for helping the separatist group than participants in the low call for separatism condition (Hypothesis 2a). Moreover, we predicted that this effect would be mediated by continuation threat (Hypothesis 2b).
Study 1
The aim of the first study was to investigate the notion that members of the Indonesian majority would express more support for helping the separatist group when they experienced a threat to the continuation of their national identity. This prediction was based on the assumption that helping signals warmth and kindness (cf. Hopkins et al., 2007; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2012) . However, it is also possible that separatism increases the desire to help as a means of reasserting control over the separatist group and demonstrating dominance (cf. Nadler et al., 2009 ), which could have been undermined by the call for separatism. We, therefore, included a measure of control in this study for exploratory reasons, to investigate participants' motivation to exert power and control over the separatist group.
Method
Participants and design. Three hundred and two students (94 men and 199 women, 9 participants did not specify their gender; M age = 20.42, SD age = 1.34) from the Islamic University of Pekalongan and the Islamic University of Surabaya, in Java, Indonesia, participated on a voluntary basis. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: low call for separatism (n = 153) or high call for separatism (n = 149).
Procedure. Participants were addressed by an assistant researcher in their classrooms either before or after class, who asked them to participate in a brief paper-and-pencil study. The researcher did not provide information regarding the study's background or purpose at this point. They were first instructed to read a newspaper article, ostensibly from a respectable national newspaper, describing the current call for separatism in the Indonesian province of West Papua. In the low separatism threat condition, the article stated that the call for separatism in West Papua had decreased over the past decade and was expected to decrease further in the near future. In the high separatism threat condition, separatism was described to be on the rise in Papua and expected to further increase to unprecedented levels.
The article was followed up by a questionnaire. Unless otherwise indicated, all variables were assessed on 5-point scales on which participants were asked to indicate their agreement with a statement (1 = not at all, 5 = very much). Scales were created by averaging the items. The effectiveness of the manipulation was checked with 2 items ("WestPapua's desire for independence from Indonesia has leveled off over the last decade" [reverse coded]; "It is expected that the number of Papuans who call for independence will further increase"; r = .72). We further assessed continuation threat (4 items, for example, "I fear that the current political situation in West-Papua can change Indonesia's future profile and existence," "I am concerned that the current political situation in West-Papua can turn Indonesia into something different than before"; α = .77) and economic threat (4 items, for example, "I fear that the current political situation in West-Papua can debilitate Indonesia's economic power," "I fear that the current political situation in WestPapua can restrict Indonesia's future access to West-Papua's natural resources"; α = .82). Exploratory factor analysis with OBLIMIN rotation confirmed that the threat items assessed two separate constructs (together explaining 63% of the total 4
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variance, all factor loadings were above .59, crossloadings were below .32).
Support for helping West Papua was subsequently measured by assessing participants' support for eight measures that the Indonesian government could take to improve West Papua's current economic and political position. (e.g., "The Indonesian government should allocate more financial resources to West-Papua," "The Indonesian government should enhance the quality of education, healthcare, and public infrastructure in West-Papua"; α = .65). The degree to which participants felt that their government should exert control over the help provided to the separatist group was assessed with five items that were based on van Leeuwen (2007; for example, "It is very important that the control of help to the Papuans is in the hands of the Indonesian government instead of the local government," "The Indonesian government should have monitoring teams since the Papuans are unable to appropriately comprehend and use the tools handed to them" [R]; α = .73).
1 Upon finishing, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results and Conclusion
Unless otherwise indicated, the reported analyses are separate univariate analyses of variance with call for separatism as independent variable.
Manipulation check. Analysis of the manipulation check demonstrated that the manipulation was successful, F(1, 300) = 253.50, p < .001, η p 2 = .46. Participants in the high call for separatism condition reported a higher perceived tendency for West Papua to separate (M = 3.97, SD = .98) than participants in the low call for separatism condition (M = 2.17, SD = .97).
Perceived threat. The separatism manipulation affected continuation threat, F(1, 300) = 11.21, p < .001, η p 2 = .04, as well as economic threat, F(1, 300) = 15.16, p < .001, η p 2 = .05, in the expected direction-that is, participants in the high call for separatism condition reported higher levels of continuation threat (M = 3.48, SD = .94) and economic threat (M = 3.62, SD = .91) compared with participants in the low call for separatism condition (continuation threat, M = 3.13, SD = .88; economic threat, M = 3.19, SD = .98).
Support for helping. Call for separatism had a significant effect on participants' support for helping West Papua, F(1, 300) = 4.42, p = .036, η p 2 = .02. In line with Hypothesis 1, participants in the high call for separatism condition were more in favor of helping West Papua (M = 3.49, SD = .62) than those in the low call for separatism condition (M = 3.35, SD = .54).
Support for helping was regressed on continuation threat and economic threat. As expected, only continuation threat emerged as a significant predictor of support for helping, β = .32, t = 4.95, and p < .001. Economic threat, β = .01, t = 0.09, and p = .94, was unrelated to support for helping. 2 We used the bootstrap approach to examine whether the observed effect of call for separatism on support for helping was mediated by perceived continuation threat. Following recommendations, we resampled 5,000 times (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) . Confirming Hypothesis 2, zero fell outside the 95% confidence interval (which ranged from .0139 to .0612), demonstrating that perceived continuation threat mediated the effect of call for separatism on support for helping.
Control.
No effect was found on the degree to which participants wanted their government to coordinate and stay in control over the help provided to the separatist group, F(1, 300) = .073, p = .788, η p 2 = .00. Although participants in general expressed a moderate desire for control (M = 3.82, SD = .66), participants in the high call for separatism condition did not express a greater desire for control (M = 3.81, SD = .70) than participants in the low call for separatism condition (M = 3.83, SD = .63).
Conclusion.
The results provide full support for the prediction that the call for separatism can increase support for helping the separatist movement. Moreover, as expected, continuation threat but not economic threat mediated this effect. We also found that participants in the high call for separatism condition did not wish their government to exert more control over the separatist group than those in the low call for separatism condition did. Although null effects should always be interpreted with caution, this observation seems to speak against an alternative explanation for our findings in terms of regaining control and asserting dominance.
Study 2
We argued in the general introduction to this article that people could express support for helping the separatist group to send a signal that they would like it to remain included within the majority. The results from the first study are in line with this reasoning but do not conclusively demonstrate the communicative nature of helping. For example, because helping implies that one's group is valued and needed (van Leeuwen, 2007) , helping could also stem from a desire to restore the meaningfulness of a national identity that was threatened by the rejection by a small subgroup (Williams & Nida, 2011) . The goal of the second study was therefore to demonstrate the communicative nature of helping, which we attempted to achieve in two ways.
First, we reasoned that if helping is a means of communication, it would only be effective when directed at the separatist target. We therefore compared support for helping of a separatist group with support for helping of an unrelated, nonseparatist group by manipulating the target of help. We expected that our manipulation of the strength of the call for separatism would increase support for helping the separatist group but would not affect support for helping the nonseparatist group (Hypothesis 3). Moreover, the effect of the call for separatism on support for helping was expected to be mediated by perceived continuation threat among participants who could support the separatist group, but not among those who could only support a nonseparatist group (Hypothesis 4).
Second, if support for helping is indeed a signal to the separatist group that it should remain included, the degree to which participants express their support to help the separatist group should increase the perceived inclusion of this group within the larger nation-that is, the more participants who fear separation actually express their support for helping the separatist group, the more firmly they will view this group as still included within the nation. To this end, we assessed perceived inclusion of the separatist group directly following the helping measure. We predicted that the effect of separatism threat on perceived inclusion would be mediated by the degree to which people expressed their support for helping the separatist group (Hypothesis 5).
This study also included an exploratory measure of participants' desire for the separatist group to remain included within the broader Republic of Indonesia. This measure allows us to investigate the assumption that support for governmental help of the separatist group results from a desire to keep this group included.
Method
Participants and design. One hundred and eighty students (58 men and 106 women, 16 participants did not specify their gender; M age = 20.35, SD age = 1.41) from the Islamic University of Pekalongan in Java, Indonesia, participated on a voluntary basis. Participants were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (call for separatism: low vs. high) × 2 (help target: irrelevant vs. relevant) between participants experimental design.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in the first study, with a few exceptions. The separatist province presented in the newspaper article as having an increasing (high call for separatism) or decreasing (low call for separatism) desire to separate from Indonesia was Bandah Aceh. Aceh, like Papua, has been expressing a desire for more autonomy for decades (Miller, 2004) . Participants were informed of an educational crisis in Aceh (relevant target condition) or in South Kalimantan (irrelevant target condition), where poor financial circumstances made it impossible to provide even the most basic facilities for education, including housing and schoolbooks (a procedure identical to that used by van Leeuwen & Mashuri, 2012) . We chose Aceh over West Papua in this study because of its comparability to South Kalimantan (Suryadinata, Arifin, & Ananta, 2003) , as both have a predominantly Muslim population, and both are replete with natural resources. Contrary to Aceh, South Kalimantan has never expressed a desire for more autonomy. We opted for help with an educational crisis over general help (as in Study 1) because the latter may be construed differently when aimed at a separatist province (where it could be seen as a way of helping the separatist province reintegrate) compared with a nonseparatist province.
In the subsequent questionnaire, we assessed the effectiveness of the manipulation (r = .74), continuation threat (α = .83), and realistic threat (α = .80), using the same scales as in Study 1. Participants could then indicate, in eight items, to what extent they believed that the Indonesian government should help Aceh/South Kalimantan with its educational crisis (e.g., "The Indonesian government should provide financial support for the purchase of new schoolbooks for primary and secondary schools in Aceh/South Kalimantan," "The Indonesian government should provide financial support for building additional primary and secondary schools in Aceh/ South Kalimantan"; 1 = not at all, 5 = very much; α = .83). Perceived inclusion was subsequently measured with 4 items (e.g., "I think that the Acehnese are as typical for Indonesia as other ethnic groups in Indonesia," "I think Indonesia is nothing without the Acehnese"; 1 = not at all, 5 = very much), as well as with a graphic scale depicting the relationship between Aceh and other Indonesian provinces, represented by several circles (1 = highly dispersed, 5 = highly overlapping). Because the items and the graphic scale loaded on a single factor in PCA (eigenvalue = 2.22), we combined them into one scale (after z-transformation; α = .68). Participants' desire for the separatist group to remain included within the Republic of Indonesia was measured with three items (e.g., "If Aceh wants to separate from Indonesia, that is fine with me" [R] , "I hope that Aceh will always be faithful to Indonesia"; 1 = not at all, 5 = very much; α = .73). At the end of the study, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results and Conclusion
Unless otherwise indicated, the reported analyses are separate univariate analyses of variance with call for separatism and help target as independent variables. Support for helping was regressed on perceived continuation threat and perceived realistic threat. As in the first study, only continuation threat emerged as a significant predictor of support for helping, β = .26, t = 2.99, and p =.003, whereas realistic threat, β = −.15, t = −1.74, and p = .08, was unrelated to helping. To test Hypothesis 4, we conducted a moderated mediation analysis using the bootstrap approach (cf. Model 3, Preacher & Hayes, 2008) , resampling 5,000 times. As predicted, perceived continuation threat mediated the effect of call for separatism on support for helping within the relevant target condition (boot indirect effect = 0.04, SE = 0.02, z = 2.05, p = .041, 95% CI = [−.0237, .0462]) but not within the irrelevant target condition (boot indirect effect = 0.01, SE = 0.01, z = 0.65, n.s., 95% CI = [.0119, .0882]).
Perceived inclusion. We observed main effects of call for separatism, F(1, 176) = 8.30, p = .004, η p 2 = .05, and help target, F(1, 176) = 8.91, p = .003, η p 2 = .05, on the degree to which Aceh was viewed as included within the Republic of Indonesia. However, these effects were fully qualified by the significant interaction term, F(1, 176) = 4.08, p = .045, η p 2 = .02. Among those who could express support for helping the relevant target of Aceh, participants in the high call for separatism condition viewed Aceh as significantly more included (M = .37, SD = .66) compared with those in the low call for separatism condition (M = −0.09, SD = 0.57), F(1, 176) = 11.62, p = .001, η p 2 = .06. Among participants who could express support for helping the irrelevant target of South Kalimantan, no difference was found between the high call for separatism condition (M = −0.10, SD = 0.67) and the low call for separatism condition (M = −0.18, SD = 0.64), F(1, 176) = .38, n.s.
We subsequently conducted a mediation analysis using the bootstrap approach (5,000 samples) to investigate the degree to which perceived inclusion of Aceh within Indonesia was mediated by support for helping. Zero fell outside the 95% confidence interval, which ranged from .0072 to .0646. This supports Hypothesis 5 in demonstrating that support for helping mediated the interaction effect of call for separatism and help target on perceived inclusion of the separatist group-that is, the more participants expressed support for helping the separatist group, the more firmly they viewed this group as included within the nation.
Desire for inclusion. Participants' desire for Aceh to remain included within Indonesia was unaffected by the manipulations (all Fs < 1). We subsequently regressed support for helping on the desire for inclusion, call for separatism, help target, and all possible interaction terms to investigate to what extent support for help was predicted by the desire for the separatist group to stay included. The analysis yielded a marginally significant three-way interaction term, β = .14, t = 1.90, and p = .059. Simple slope analysis revealed that the desire for Aceh to remain included was a marginally significant predictor of support for help among participants in the high call for separatism, relevant target condition, β = .12, t = 1.66, and p = .098. This observation provides tentative support for the reasoning that helping in this condition is an expression of a desire to keep the separatist group included within the larger group. Desire for inclusion was also marginally related to support for helping in the low call for separatism, irrelevant target condition, β = .12, t = 1.67, and p = .096, but not in any of the other conditions (all ps > .50).
Conclusion.
The results support the strategic use of helping as a mean to reduce the threat to the continuation and integrity of the national identity, as triggered by the call for separatism. Continuation threat triggered by the separatist movement increased the desire to help the separatist movement but not another, unrelated province. Moreover, participants who expressed their support for helping the separatist movement subsequently viewed this group as more firmly included within the nation. Exploratory additional analyses further showed a trend indicating that participants' desire to keep the separatist group included within the nation predicted their support for helping this group.
General Discussion
Separatism as a phenomenon receives frequent and widespread media attention but is barely covered in psychological investigations. A few researchers have studied the motives underlying separatist movements, demonstrating that the intention to separate from the majority is rooted in the perception that the majority's norms and values are incongruent with the separatist group's social identity (Sani & Todman, 2002) and that separatist groups feel estranged from the majority (Sani, 2008) . However, no research to date has studied the majority's response to separatism. These insights are important because the dynamics of separatism and, in particular, the question whether the process of separatism is a peaceful or violent one are determined as much by the separatist movement's actions as by the majority's response to this movement. The current research aimed to fill this gap by demonstrating that the majority group (a) experiences separatism as a threat to the continuation and integrity of their national identity and to their economy and (b) can respond in a peaceful manner by helping the separatist group, thereby expressing its desire for the separatist group to remain included. Previous research has demonstrated the power of helping as a communicative tool (e.g., Hopkins et al., 2007; Nadler & Halabi, 2006; , but this is the first study to demonstrate that the communicative nature of helping can effectively negate a threat to the continuation and integrity of the national identity. One important limitation of the current research is that we did not directly assess the extent to which helping the separatist group effectively reduced feelings of continuation threat that were triggered by the call for separatism. Although the results from the second study demonstrated that participants in the high call for separatism condition viewed the separatist group as more firmly included after expressing their support for help of that group, the study contained neither a baseline measure of perceived inclusion nor a follow-up measure of perceived continuation threat. We can therefore conclude that perceived continuation threat increased the desire to help the separatist group, but we cannot state conclusively that support for government help of the separatist group significantly decreased these feelings of threat. This is an issue that should be addressed in future research.
An additional limitation is that we did not study the effectiveness of helping in actually reducing the separatist group's call for separation-that is, we demonstrated that members of the majority view the separatist group as more firmly included within the nation after helping, but we do not know whether the separatist group would, in actuality, reduce its call for separatism in response to the majority's help. This should be a focal point in future research. On the one hand, prior research suggests that an offer of help could improve intergroup relations. People who help others tend to generate liking, trust, and respect (Alvarez & van Leeuwen, 2011) , and helping is often used to improve the public image of a group (Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009; Hopkins et al., 2007) . On the other hand, research has shown that offers of help, even when well-intended, are easily interpreted by the recipient group as strategic attempts to assert dominance (Halabi & Nadler, 2010; Nadler & Halabi, 2006) . The willingness to receive help from another group declines dramatically in contexts characterized by conflict and competition . The effectiveness of helping as a strategy to persuade the separatist movement to remain included thus appears at least partially dependent on the degree to which the gesture is interpreted as an act of kindness or as a means of asserting dominance.
Data from two studies showed that separatist movements trigger feelings of continuation threat and economic threat, but only continuation threat mediated the effect of the call for separatism on helping. We believe that feelings of economic threat may be more likely to engender a conflictual response than a peaceful response. Economic threat implies that the separatist movement will harm the majority by draining the nation's valuable resources. This could trigger a competitive orientation in which the likelihood of reciprocating in a nonpeaceful manner is increased (Cikara, Botvinick, & Fiske, 2011; Esses et al., 1998) . The current research was designed to measure the likelihood of peaceful responses to separatism, but future research should investigate what factors can lead up to nonpeaceful responses, including aggression and conflict.
In both our studies, we assessed the willingness to help the outgroup through participants' support for government measures. This dependent variable could be criticized on the basis that it does reflect actual behavior. Expressing support for government policy does not involve much personal cost and may therefore not always translate into actual behavior. However, it is in fact quite difficult to assess actual intergroup behavior, particularly with respect to large groups. Donating money or volunteering time and effort are clear expressions of behavior, but as they are essentially behaviors expressed by individuals, they can be criticized for not reflecting intergroup processes. For example, if we had asked participants to personally donate money to the people of WestPapua or Aceh, helping could also be interpreted as an individual strategy, by demonstrating genuine concern for the separatist group, in contrast to a possible presumed lack of caring for this group by the national government or military (see van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2012) . We opted for the current measures because we reasoned that intergroup behavior where large groups are concerned is often reflected in the actions of group representatives, such as governments, and (democratic) governments depend on the support of the people they represent.
Given that psychologists have virtually ignored separatism as a topic of study (but see Sani, 2008; Sani & Pugliese, 8 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin XX(X) 2008), and in particular the majority's response to separatism movements, there are many avenues in this domain that deserve further exploration. For example, drawing on social exclusion literature (Williams, 2002; Williams & Nida, 2011) , future research could investigate to what extent both the separatist movement, as well as the majority in response to the separatist movement, feel rejected, thereby threatening the four basic needs of belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence. One fundamental difference between social exclusion of individuals and rejection of an entire group is that members of a rejected group can still experience a sense of belonging to their group. Although positive in the sense that this continued group membership can buffer against the negative consequences of being rejected, Williams and Nida (2011) suggested that it can also set into motion radicalism and intolerance, as well as the propensity and means to accomplish violent behavior. If this is true, it only further underlines the necessity for studying separatism conflict in more detail, with a particular focus on factors that can contribute to conflict de-escalation and resolution.
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Notes
1. Both studies reported in this article contained several additional measures that were included for exploratory purposes. Because none of these measures was affected by the manipulations, and because the measures were not central to our research question, they were not reported in this article. 2. We also measured two other potential sources of threat in our questionnaire that could be activated by separatism threat. Given that "Unity in Diversity" ("Bhinneka Tunggal Ika") is Indonesia's national motto, we assessed the possibility that separatism threatens Indonesia's ideology of unity in diversity (four items; α = .90). Although the separatism manipulation affected ideology threat in the expected direction, F(1, 300) = 16.10, p < .001, η p 2 = .05; M high separatism threat = 3.72, SD = .98; M low separatism threat = 3.23, SD = 1.15, ideology threat was unrelated to helping when controlling for continuation threat and economic threat, β = .12, t = 1.62, and p = .11. We also assessed the degree to which separatism threatens the perceived entitativity of the Republic of Indonesia (four items; α = .81), but entitativity threat was not affected by the separatism manipulation, F(1, 300) = 2.01, p = .16, n.s.
